# Amazon Bedrock AgentCore runs your agent as an IAM execution role you scope

Facts read 10 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.

Runtime runs the agent under an IAM execution role that AgentCore assumes. AWS documents that the console can create the execution role for you if the console role has the listed IAM create permissions, and that Gateway can create a service role and attach permissions each time you add a target.

Runtime runs the agent under an IAM execution role that AgentCore assumes, and Gateway uses a gateway service role for IAM-based outbound calls. AWS warns that the BedrockAgentCoreFullAccess managed policy, for the person or application using AgentCore, grants broad permissions. The contents of the auto-created execution role: none found on 2026-11-10. SCPs and permissions boundaries apply to these roles, and AgentCore Policy at Gateway intercepts tool calls before execution.

For tool calls, the identity depends on the target. Outbound authorization can use the gateway service role, the caller's IAM credentials, OAuth, token exchange, token passthrough or an API key, so each target needs its own decision. Runtime can run in your VPC with security groups. AWS documents CloudTrail coverage for Gateway; for Runtime API calls: none found on 2026-11-10 in the pages read.

- **Status:** AWS documents AgentCore as the platform it recommends in place of Amazon Bedrock Agents Classic. The overview page read on 2026-11-10 carries no preview or general availability label for Runtime, Gateway or Identity. ([source](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/what-is-bedrock-agentcore.html))
- **The identity it runs as:** Runtime runs the agent under an IAM execution role that AgentCore assumes. Gateway uses a gateway service role for IAM-based outbound calls. AgentCore Identity is a separate service that manages credentials so agents can reach AWS resources and third-party services on behalf of users. ([source](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/runtime-permissions.html))
- **What it gets by default:** AWS documents that the console can create the execution role for you if the console role has the listed IAM create permissions, and that Gateway can create a service role and attach permissions each time you add a target. AWS warns that the BedrockAgentCoreFullAccess managed policy, for the person or application using AgentCore, grants broad permissions. The contents of the auto-created execution role: none found on 2026-11-10 in the pages read. ([source](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/runtime-permissions.html))
- **Tools and actions:** Gateway turns APIs, Lambda functions and existing services into tools reachable through Gateway endpoints. For each target, outbound authorization can use the gateway service role (SigV4), the caller's IAM credentials, OAuth (client credentials, authorization code, or token exchange), token passthrough, or an API key, so the identity of a tool call depends on which option the target uses. ([source](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/gateway-outbound-auth.html))
- **The agent's permissions or the user's:** Both are documented. Runtime can fetch OAuth tokens on behalf of end users when a user ID header or a JWT is supplied. Gateway outbound calls can use the caller's IAM credentials, a user-delegated authorization code grant, a token exchange that carries the user and agent identities, or the machine-to-machine client credentials grant that acts on the application's own behalf. ([source](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/gateway-outbound-auth.html))
- **Network reachability:** AWS documents VPC connectivity for Runtime and the built-in Code Interpreter and Browser tools: AgentCore creates network interfaces in your VPC through a service-linked role. A public subnet does not give internet access; AWS says internet access needs private subnets with a route to a NAT Gateway. ([source](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/agentcore-vpc.html))
- **What is logged:** AgentCore stores metrics, spans and logs in Amazon CloudWatch. AWS documents CloudTrail coverage for only some AgentCore capabilities (Gateway and Agent Registry are the ones named); CloudTrail coverage for Runtime API calls: none found on 2026-11-10 in the pages read. ([source](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/observability.html))

## Boundaries that apply

- **IAM policy on the execution role and gateway service role.** AWS says the execution role is what Runtime assumes to run the agent, so its policy limits what agent code can call in your account. ([source](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/runtime-permissions.html))
- **Resource-based policies on AgentCore resources.** AWS documents resource-based policies to control access to runtime resources. ([source](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/runtime-permissions.html))
- **SCPs and permissions boundaries.** AWS lists permissions boundaries and SCPs among the policy types that apply to AgentCore IAM entities. ([source](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/security-iam.html))
- **IAM deny of InvokeAgentRuntimeForUser.** Passing a user ID header to Runtime needs a separate IAM action, so you can deny that action where user ID delegation is not needed. ([source](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/runtime-oauth.html))
- **AgentCore Policy at Gateway.** AWS describes AgentCore Policy as intercepting every tool call at Gateway before execution, with rules for which tools agents can use and under what conditions. ([source](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/what-is-bedrock-agentcore.html))
- **VPC security groups.** When Runtime uses VPC connectivity, security groups on the network interfaces control reachable destinations. ([source](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/agentcore-vpc.html))

## Checks to run for AWS

- [Give each agent its own role or service account, not a shared one](/checklist/own-identity-per-agent/): Use one Lambda execution role per function, or one EKS Pod Identity association per service account, so each agent maps to its own IAM role.
- [Use short-lived role credentials and no long-lived access keys for the agent](/checklist/short-lived-credentials/): Have the workload use temporary credentials through an IAM role rather than IAM user access keys.
- [Limit who can pass, attach or impersonate the agent's role](/checklist/restrict-who-can-attach-role/): Grant iam:PassRole only for the specific roles a principal needs to pass to a service.
- [Scope the role's trust to the specific agent, service account or workload](/checklist/scope-trust-to-the-agent/): Use trust policy conditions (for Pod Identity, session tags for service account, namespace and cluster; for services, aws:SourceArn and aws:SourceAccount).
- [Do not run the agent as a default or pre-granted account](/checklist/no-default-accounts/): Replace the console-created default role with a role you wrote; AWS documents the Lambda console default as an execution role with minimal permissions (basic logging).
- [Write the agent's permission policy from what its tools actually call](/checklist/least-privilege-policy/): Start from the documented minimum policy and narrow it; AWS says to use broad deployment permissions only for development and testing.
- [Set an organization-level ceiling the agent's role cannot exceed](/checklist/set-permission-ceiling/): Apply SCPs, which specify the maximum available permissions for IAM roles in the organization, and permissions boundaries on the agent's role.
- [Explicitly deny the agent IAM changes and destructive actions](/checklist/deny-iam-changes-and-destructive-actions/): Use an SCP or permissions boundary whose maximum excludes IAM write actions and destructive calls on protected resources.

**Where Act is behind.** Act draws the boundary at the access layer (cloud IAM and network controls, and the gateways or MCP servers in front of agents); it does not inspect prompts or model outputs, which needs a different tool. Your team applies the boundaries it proposes, and its customer evidence for AI boundaries is less mature than for its core access control.

## Related pages

- [Agent Runtime on Gemini Enterprise Agent Platform (formerly Vertex AI Agent Engine, Agent Builder): identity, permissions and boundaries](/agent-platforms/agent-runtime-gcp/)
- [Gemini Enterprise (agents hosted on Agent Runtime): identity, permissions and boundaries](/agent-platforms/gemini-enterprise/)
- [Microsoft Foundry Agent Service (formerly Azure AI Foundry Agent Service): identity, permissions and boundaries](/agent-platforms/foundry-agent-service/)

## Sources

- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/what-is-bedrock-agentcore.: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/what-is-bedrock-agentcore.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/agents-classic-maintenance-mode.htm: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/agents-classic-maintenance-mode.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/runtime-permissions.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/runtime-permissions.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/gateway-outbound-auth.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/gateway-outbound-auth.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/identity.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/identity.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/runtime-oauth.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/runtime-oauth.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/agentcore-vpc.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/agentcore-vpc.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/observability.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/observability.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/security-iam.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock-agentcore/latest/devguide/security-iam.html (read 10 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://aiagentaccesscontrol.com/agent-platforms/bedrock-agentcore/
