A Microsoft Foundry agent starts with no resource permissions, and you grant each role
Facts read 10 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.
Each agent gets a Microsoft Entra agent identity, a special service principal created under an agent blueprint. Microsoft documents that a newly created agent identity starts without resource permissions and that Foundry does not automatically assign RBAC roles to it; you or an administrator grant access through the target service.
The full map ยท Azure overview
Each agent gets a Microsoft Entra agent identity, a special service principal created under an agent blueprint. Microsoft documents that a new agent identity starts without resource permissions and that Foundry does not assign RBAC roles to it automatically. Legacy agents can share the project-wide managed identity, which gives no per-agent separation. The service was formerly Azure AI Foundry Agent Service, and Microsoft labels agent identity acting on behalf of the user as preview.
Role assignments at the agent scope are currently evaluated only for agent endpoint access, so they limit who can call an agent, not what the agent can reach. What it can reach comes from Azure RBAC on the agent identity. A Standard Setup with private networking removes public egress. Entra sign-in logs show which agent identity got a token for which resource, and on behalf of which user.
- Status
- Documented as Microsoft Foundry Agent Service; documentation URLs still use the ai-foundry path, and Microsoft documents that the Foundry RBAC roles were renamed from the Azure AI names. Microsoft labels several features preview, including agent identity acting on behalf of the user. (source)
- The identity it runs as
- Each agent gets a Microsoft Entra agent identity, a special service principal created under an agent blueprint. Hosted agents get a dedicated Entra agent identity at deploy time. A project-wide managed identity also exists, and legacy agents share it, with no per-agent separation. (source)
- What it gets by default
- Microsoft documents that a newly created agent identity starts without resource permissions and that Foundry does not automatically assign RBAC roles to it; you or an administrator grant access through the target service. For people, Microsoft names Foundry Agent Consumer as the least-privilege role for those who only interact with agents. (source)
- Tools and actions
- For MCP and A2A tools, Agent Service passes a scoped agent identity token and the downstream resource checks the agent identity's RBAC role assignments. Tool connections can also use key-based access, the agent's or project's managed identity, or OAuth identity passthrough. OpenAPI tools support anonymous, API key or project managed identity authentication. With function calling, your own app executes the function. (source)
- The agent's permissions or the user's
- Both are documented. Application-only access uses the agent's own authority; delegated access acts on behalf of the signed-in user, which needs both the agent's authorization and the user's access. Microsoft labels agent identity acting on behalf of the user as preview. (source)
- Network reachability
- Microsoft documents a Standard Setup with private networking: no public egress and a delegated subnet from your virtual network. Private networking is available for prompt agents; hosted agents support bring-your-own virtual network, with each session in a VM-isolated sandbox connected to your VNet. (source)
- What is logged
- Microsoft documents three sources: Entra sign-in logs (which agent identity obtained a token for which resource, including on behalf of which user), Entra audit logs (blueprint and agent identity creation and deletion), and Foundry tracing in the connected Application Insights resource for tool calls. (source)
Boundaries that apply
- Azure RBAC on the agent identity. The downstream resource checks the agent identity's role assignments before granting or denying access. (source)
- Foundry RBAC roles and agent-scope assignments. Role assignments at the agent scope are currently evaluated only for agent endpoint access, so they limit who can call a specific agent, not what the agent can reach. (source)
- Azure Policy. Microsoft documents Azure Policy for auditing and governing Foundry resource state. (source)
- Virtual network isolation. The Standard Setup with private networking removes public egress and uses your delegated subnet. (source)
- Hosted agent sandbox. Each hosted-agent session runs in its own VM-isolated sandbox that holds no blueprint credential. (source)
Checks to run for Azure
- Give each agent its own role or service account, not a shared one: Use the per-agent Entra agent identity that Foundry creates, or a system-assigned managed identity that is tied to one container app.
- Use short-lived role credentials and no long-lived access keys for the agent: Use a managed identity; Microsoft documents that you do not manage its credentials.
- Scope the role's trust to the specific agent, service account or workload: Configure workload identity federation so one managed identity trusts one Kubernetes workload.
- Write the agent's permission policy from what its tools actually call: Grant the least privilege needed and avoid broader roles at broader scopes.
- Set an organization-level ceiling the agent's role cannot exceed: Use deny assignments, which block listed actions even when a role assignment grants them (customer-managed deny assignments are documented as private preview), and apply governance conditions at management group scope.
- Explicitly deny the agent IAM changes and destructive actions: Use deny assignments to block specific actions even if a role assignment grants them.
- Compare the agent's granted permissions with what it used and remove the rest: Run recurring Microsoft Entra access reviews of role assignments.
- Grant roles at the narrowest scope that works: Assign the role at resource or resource group scope instead of subscription or management group scope.
Where Act is behind
Act draws the boundary at the access layer (cloud IAM and network controls, and the gateways or MCP servers in front of agents); it does not inspect prompts or model outputs, which needs a different tool. Your team applies the boundaries it proposes, and its customer evidence for AI boundaries is less mature than for its core access control.
Related pages
Sources
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/agents/overview, read 10 Nov 2026
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/concepts/rbac-foundry, read 10 Nov 2026
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/agents/concepts/agent-identity, read 10 Nov 2026
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/agents/concepts/hosted-agents, read 10 Nov 2026
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/agents/how-to/tools/openapi, read 10 Nov 2026
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/agents/how-to/tools/function-calling, read 10 Nov 2026
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/agents/how-to/virtual-networks, read 10 Nov 2026
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/how-to/azure-policy, read 10 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026.