# What an AI agent can access in AWS, and the controls that bound it

Facts read 10 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.

In AWS, an AI agent runs as an IAM role, and can reach whatever that identity's permissions and the network allow. The map covers 3 ways to run one: Amazon Bedrock Agents; Amazon Bedrock AgentCore; Self-hosted agent on AWS Lambda or Amazon EKS.

In AWS the agent is an IAM role. Amazon Bedrock Agents Classic runs as a service role, Amazon Bedrock AgentCore Runtime as an execution role, and a Lambda or EKS agent as its function or pod role. The checklist's AWS answers put the limits on that role: an SCP or permissions boundary as the ceiling (ab-07), an explicit deny of IAM changes and destructive actions (ab-08), and trust policy conditions that name the agent (ab-04).

Around the role sit the network and the tools. The checklist uses private subnets, security groups and AWS Network Firewall for egress (ab-15, ab-16), VPC interface endpoints for AWS APIs (ab-17), and a separate role and resource-based policy for each tool function (ab-19, ab-20). Logging is an organization trail plus data events, which trails do not log by default (ab-27, ab-28).

| Agent platform | Runs as | Network |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [Amazon Bedrock Agents (now Amazon Bedrock Agents Classic)](/agent-platforms/bedrock-agents/) | AWS documents that the agent runs as an IAM service role that Amazon Bedrock assumes. | AWS documents interface endpoints (AWS PrivateLink) for the bedrock-agent and bedrock-agent-runtime APIs, with an endpoint policy you can attach. |
| [Amazon Bedrock AgentCore (Runtime, Gateway, Identity)](/agent-platforms/bedrock-agentcore/) | Runtime runs the agent under an IAM execution role that AgentCore assumes. | AWS documents VPC connectivity for Runtime and the built-in Code Interpreter and Browser tools: AgentCore creates network interfaces in your VPC through a service-linked role. |
| [Self-hosted agent on AWS Lambda or Amazon EKS](/agent-platforms/self-hosted-aws/) | A Lambda function runs as its execution role. | AWS documents attaching a Lambda function to a VPC: private subnets for private resources, and a public subnet does not give a function internet access. |

## The checklist, AWS column

- [Give each agent its own role or service account, not a shared one](/checklist/own-identity-per-agent/): Use one Lambda execution role per function, or one EKS Pod Identity association per service account, so each agent maps to its own IAM role.
- [Use short-lived role credentials and no long-lived access keys for the agent](/checklist/short-lived-credentials/): Have the workload use temporary credentials through an IAM role rather than IAM user access keys.
- [Limit who can pass, attach or impersonate the agent's role](/checklist/restrict-who-can-attach-role/): Grant iam:PassRole only for the specific roles a principal needs to pass to a service.
- [Scope the role's trust to the specific agent, service account or workload](/checklist/scope-trust-to-the-agent/): Use trust policy conditions (for Pod Identity, session tags for service account, namespace and cluster; for services, aws:SourceArn and aws:SourceAccount).
- [Do not run the agent as a default or pre-granted account](/checklist/no-default-accounts/): Replace the console-created default role with a role you wrote; AWS documents the Lambda console default as an execution role with minimal permissions (basic logging).
- [Write the agent's permission policy from what its tools actually call](/checklist/least-privilege-policy/): Start from the documented minimum policy and narrow it; AWS says to use broad deployment permissions only for development and testing.
- [Set an organization-level ceiling the agent's role cannot exceed](/checklist/set-permission-ceiling/): Apply SCPs, which specify the maximum available permissions for IAM roles in the organization, and permissions boundaries on the agent's role.
- [Explicitly deny the agent IAM changes and destructive actions](/checklist/deny-iam-changes-and-destructive-actions/): Use an SCP or permissions boundary whose maximum excludes IAM write actions and destructive calls on protected resources.
- [Compare the agent's granted permissions with what it used and remove the rest](/checklist/remove-unused-permissions/): Create an IAM Access Analyzer unused access analyzer to find unused access.
- [Grant roles at the narrowest scope that works](/checklist/narrowest-scope/): Name specific resource ARNs in the policy; AWS's Bedrock guidance says to replace the wildcard with specific agent IDs once they exist.
- [Keep the encryption keys for agent data under your control and limit who can use them](/checklist/control-the-keys/): Use a KMS key policy, which AWS calls the primary way to control access to a KMS key.
- [Block public access on storage the agent can write to](/checklist/block-public-exposure/): Turn on S3 Block Public Access settings.
- [Put data stores the agent reads inside a perimeter that blocks copying data out](/checklist/data-perimeter/): Build a data perimeter with identity, resource and network controls, including VPC endpoint policies.
- [Limit data access with tags, attributes or conditions, not only resource lists](/checklist/condition-based-data-access/): Use attribute-based access control with tags on IAM entities and resources.
- [Run agent compute on private networks with no direct path to the internet](/checklist/private-network-no-direct-internet/): Attach functions to private subnets; AWS says a public subnet does not give a Lambda function internet access.
- [Allow outbound traffic only to the destinations the agent needs](/checklist/allowlist-egress/): Use security group rules and AWS Network Firewall to filter traffic at the perimeter of the VPC.
- [Reach cloud APIs and data stores through private endpoints](/checklist/private-endpoints-for-cloud-apis/): Create VPC interface endpoints with AWS PrivateLink.
- [Keep the agent's code from reading node, instance or other workloads' credentials](/checklist/credential-isolation/): Restrict access to the EC2 Instance Metadata Service for pods so containers can only retrieve credentials for their own role.
- [Give each tool function its own least-privilege role instead of the agent's role](/checklist/tool-own-role/): Action group Lambda functions run under their own execution role, and Bedrock reaches them through a resource-based policy.
- [Restrict which principals can invoke each tool endpoint](/checklist/restrict-tool-invokers/): Attach a resource-based policy on the tool's Lambda function that allows only the Bedrock service principal for one agent ARN.
- [Cap how much the agent can run and spend](/checklist/cap-run-and-spend/): Set Lambda reserved concurrency and AWS Budgets alerts.
- [Decide for each tool whether the action runs with the agent's authority or the signed-in user's](/checklist/decide-user-or-agent-authority/): AgentCore Gateway lets each target use the gateway role, the caller's credentials, or a token exchange that carries the user and agent identities.
- [Run agents in their own account, project or subscription](/checklist/dedicated-account-project-subscription/): Use separate AWS accounts to isolate workloads.
- [Tag every agent resource with an owner and environment, and enforce the tags](/checklist/tag-agent-resources/): Attach tags to IAM entities and resources; AWS documents tags as the attributes for attribute-based access control.
- [Test permission and policy changes in a dry run before enforcing them](/checklist/test-before-enforcing/): Use the IAM policy simulator to test identity-based policies.
- [Remove the agent's identity and access when the agent is retired](/checklist/retire-identity-with-agent/): none found on 2026-11-10
- [Turn on organization-wide audit logging of control-plane actions](/checklist/control-plane-audit-logs/): Create an organization trail in CloudTrail.
- [Log reads and writes to the data the agent touches](/checklist/log-data-access/): Configure CloudTrail data events, which trails do not log by default.
- [Make every logged action traceable to the specific agent identity](/checklist/attribute-actions-to-the-agent/): CloudTrail records the type of IAM identity that made each request in the userIdentity element.
- [Alert on denied calls and on changes to the agent's role or policies](/checklist/alert-on-denied-and-role-changes/): Send CloudTrail events to CloudWatch Logs and alarm on matching events.

**Where Act is behind.** Act draws the boundary at the access layer (cloud IAM and network controls, and the gateways or MCP servers in front of agents); it does not inspect prompts or model outputs, which needs a different tool. Your team applies the boundaries it proposes, and its customer evidence for AI boundaries is less mature than for its core access control.

## Related pages

- [What an AI agent can access in Google Cloud](/clouds/gcp/)
- [What an AI agent can access in Azure](/clouds/azure/)
- [About](/about/)

## Sources

- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/agents.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/agents.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/agents-classic-maintenance-mode.htm: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/agents-classic-maintenance-mode.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/agents-permissions.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/agents-permissions.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/agents-lambda.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/agents-lambda.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/lambda-intro-execution-role.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/lambda-intro-execution-role.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/agents-how.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/agents-how.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/vpc-interface-endpoints.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/vpc-interface-endpoints.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/usingVPC.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/usingVPC.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/logging-using-cloudtrail.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/logging-using-cloudtrail.html (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/model-invocation-logging.html: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/model-invocation-logging.html (read 10 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://aiagentaccesscontrol.com/clouds/aws/
