# What an AI agent can access in Azure, and the controls that bound it

Facts read 10 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.

In Azure, an AI agent runs as a managed identity or an Entra agent identity, and can reach whatever that identity's permissions and the network allow. The map covers 2 ways to run one: Microsoft Foundry Agent Service; Self-hosted agent on Azure Container Apps or AKS.

In Azure the agent is a Microsoft Entra agent identity in Foundry Agent Service, or a managed identity on Container Apps and AKS. Foundry gives a new agent identity no resource permissions, so access is whatever you assign with Azure RBAC. The checklist asks for assignment at resource or resource group scope rather than subscription scope (ab-10) and deny assignments as the ceiling (ab-07, ab-08), noting that customer-managed deny assignments are in private preview.

Network and logs need deliberate setup. Foundry's Standard Setup with private networking removes public egress (ab-15); Container Apps and AKS are open by default. Entra sign-in logs show which agent identity got a token and for which user (ab-29), and resource logs are not collected until you create a diagnostic setting (ab-28). Restricting who can attach a managed identity: none found on 2026-11-10 (ab-03).

| Agent platform | Runs as | Network |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [Microsoft Foundry Agent Service (formerly Azure AI Foundry Agent Service)](/agent-platforms/foundry-agent-service/) | Each agent gets a Microsoft Entra agent identity, a special service principal created under an agent blueprint. | Microsoft documents a Standard Setup with private networking: no public egress and a delegated subnet from your virtual network. |
| [Self-hosted agent on Azure Container Apps or AKS](/agent-platforms/self-hosted-azure/) | A container app can have a system-assigned managed identity (tied to the app) or user-assigned identities (standalone resources). | By default Container Apps is publicly accessible and can communicate only with internet-accessible endpoints; supplying your own virtual network adds control over outbound traffic and access to private endpoints. |

## The checklist, Azure column

- [Give each agent its own role or service account, not a shared one](/checklist/own-identity-per-agent/): Use the per-agent Entra agent identity that Foundry creates, or a system-assigned managed identity that is tied to one container app.
- [Use short-lived role credentials and no long-lived access keys for the agent](/checklist/short-lived-credentials/): Use a managed identity; Microsoft documents that you do not manage its credentials.
- [Limit who can pass, attach or impersonate the agent's role](/checklist/restrict-who-can-attach-role/): none found on 2026-11-10
- [Scope the role's trust to the specific agent, service account or workload](/checklist/scope-trust-to-the-agent/): Configure workload identity federation so one managed identity trusts one Kubernetes workload.
- [Do not run the agent as a default or pre-granted account](/checklist/no-default-accounts/): none found on 2026-11-10
- [Write the agent's permission policy from what its tools actually call](/checklist/least-privilege-policy/): Grant the least privilege needed and avoid broader roles at broader scopes.
- [Set an organization-level ceiling the agent's role cannot exceed](/checklist/set-permission-ceiling/): Use deny assignments, which block listed actions even when a role assignment grants them (customer-managed deny assignments are documented as private preview), and apply governance conditions at management group scope.
- [Explicitly deny the agent IAM changes and destructive actions](/checklist/deny-iam-changes-and-destructive-actions/): Use deny assignments to block specific actions even if a role assignment grants them.
- [Compare the agent's granted permissions with what it used and remove the rest](/checklist/remove-unused-permissions/): Run recurring Microsoft Entra access reviews of role assignments.
- [Grant roles at the narrowest scope that works](/checklist/narrowest-scope/): Assign the role at resource or resource group scope instead of subscription or management group scope.
- [Keep the encryption keys for agent data under your control and limit who can use them](/checklist/control-the-keys/): Use customer-managed keys for Azure Storage held in an Azure key store.
- [Block public access on storage the agent can write to](/checklist/block-public-exposure/): Disable anonymous access on storage accounts; Microsoft recommends this.
- [Put data stores the agent reads inside a perimeter that blocks copying data out](/checklist/data-perimeter/): Use virtual network service endpoint policies to allow data exfiltration only to specific Azure Storage accounts.
- [Limit data access with tags, attributes or conditions, not only resource lists](/checklist/condition-based-data-access/): Use Azure role assignment conditions (Azure ABAC) that filter a role's permissions by attributes.
- [Run agent compute on private networks with no direct path to the internet](/checklist/private-network-no-direct-internet/): Use the Foundry Standard Setup with private networking, which Microsoft documents as having no public egress.
- [Allow outbound traffic only to the destinations the agent needs](/checklist/allowlist-egress/): Use network security groups to allow or deny outbound traffic, and Azure Firewall for central filtering.
- [Reach cloud APIs and data stores through private endpoints](/checklist/private-endpoints-for-cloud-apis/): Use private endpoints, which put a service on a private IP address from your virtual network.
- [Keep the agent's code from reading node, instance or other workloads' credentials](/checklist/credential-isolation/): Run hosted agents in per-session VM-isolated sandboxes, which Microsoft documents as holding no blueprint credential.
- [Give each tool function its own least-privilege role instead of the agent's role](/checklist/tool-own-role/): Use user-assigned managed identities per workload and control which identities are available to the container app.
- [Restrict which principals can invoke each tool endpoint](/checklist/restrict-tool-invokers/): Assign Foundry roles at agent scope to grant endpoint access to one agent without granting it for all agents in the project.
- [Cap how much the agent can run and spend](/checklist/cap-run-and-spend/): Set maximum replicas on the container app and Cost Management budgets; Microsoft notes that budget thresholds trigger notifications but do not stop consumption.
- [Decide for each tool whether the action runs with the agent's authority or the signed-in user's](/checklist/decide-user-or-agent-authority/): Foundry documents application-only access (agent's own authority) and delegated access (on behalf of the signed-in user, in preview).
- [Run agents in their own account, project or subscription](/checklist/dedicated-account-project-subscription/): Use a separate subscription, grouped under management groups.
- [Tag every agent resource with an owner and environment, and enforce the tags](/checklist/tag-agent-resources/): Use Azure Policy to govern tags.
- [Test permission and policy changes in a dry run before enforcing them](/checklist/test-before-enforcing/): Assign Azure Policy with enforcementMode DoNotEnforce.
- [Remove the agent's identity and access when the agent is retired](/checklist/retire-identity-with-agent/): Use a system-assigned managed identity, which is deleted when the container app is deleted.
- [Turn on organization-wide audit logging of control-plane actions](/checklist/control-plane-audit-logs/): Use the Azure Monitor activity log, which records management operations for Azure resources.
- [Log reads and writes to the data the agent touches](/checklist/log-data-access/): Create a diagnostic setting to collect resource logs, which are not collected until you do.
- [Make every logged action traceable to the specific agent identity](/checklist/attribute-actions-to-the-agent/): Entra sign-in logs show which agent identity obtained a token for which resource, including on behalf of which user.
- [Alert on denied calls and on changes to the agent's role or policies](/checklist/alert-on-denied-and-role-changes/): Create Azure Monitor alert rules on log data.

**Where Act is behind.** Act draws the boundary at the access layer (cloud IAM and network controls, and the gateways or MCP servers in front of agents); it does not inspect prompts or model outputs, which needs a different tool. Your team applies the boundaries it proposes, and its customer evidence for AI boundaries is less mature than for its core access control.

## Related pages

- [About](/about/)
- [Editorial policy](/editorial-policy/)
- [Corrections](/corrections/)

## Sources

- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/agents/overview: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/agents/overview (read 10 Nov 2026)
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/concepts/rbac-foundry: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/concepts/rbac-foundry (read 10 Nov 2026)
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/agents/concepts/agent-identity: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/agents/concepts/agent-identity (read 10 Nov 2026)
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/agents/concepts/hosted-agents: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/agents/concepts/hosted-agents (read 10 Nov 2026)
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/agents/how-to/tools/openapi: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/agents/how-to/tools/openapi (read 10 Nov 2026)
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/agents/how-to/tools/function-calling: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/agents/how-to/tools/function-calling (read 10 Nov 2026)
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/agents/how-to/virtual-networks: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/agents/how-to/virtual-networks (read 10 Nov 2026)
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/how-to/azure-policy: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/how-to/azure-policy (read 10 Nov 2026)
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/container-apps/managed-identity: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/container-apps/managed-identity (read 10 Nov 2026)
- learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/aks/workload-identity-overview: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/aks/workload-identity-overview (read 10 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://aiagentaccesscontrol.com/clouds/azure/
