# What an AI agent can access in Google Cloud, and the controls that bound it

Facts read 10 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.

In Google Cloud, an AI agent runs as a service account or a per-agent identity, and can reach whatever that identity's permissions and the network allow. The map covers 3 ways to run one: Agent Runtime on Gemini Enterprise Agent Platform; Gemini Enterprise; Self-hosted agent on Google Cloud Run or GKE.

In Google Cloud the agent is an agent identity on Agent Runtime, or a service account on Cloud Run or GKE. Agent Runtime lets you choose between a per-agent identity and a shared service account, and the checklist asks for the per-agent one (ab-01). The default Compute Engine service account might hold the Editor role, so ab-05 enforces the constraint that stops that grant.

The ceiling is a Principal Access Boundary policy (ab-07) and an IAM deny policy that targets agent identities (ab-08). VPC Service Controls and Private Service Connect bound data and egress (ab-13, ab-15). Cloud Audit Logs record Admin Activity always, while Data Access logs are off by default for most services and must be enabled (ab-27, ab-28).

| Agent platform | Runs as | Network |
| --- | --- | --- |
| [Agent Runtime on Gemini Enterprise Agent Platform (formerly Vertex AI Agent Engine, Agent Builder)](/agent-platforms/agent-runtime-gcp/) | Google documents three choices: a per-agent IAM agent identity (recommended, a principal tied to the individual agent); the Google-managed AI Platform Reasoning Engine Service Agent used by default; or a custom service account. | Google documents that the agent runs in a Google-managed network without access to your VPC unless you configure a Private Service Connect interface, which gives private egress to your VPC and on-premises resources. |
| [Gemini Enterprise (agents hosted on Agent Runtime)](/agent-platforms/gemini-enterprise/) | Gemini Enterprise registers an ADK agent that runs on Agent Runtime, so the agent runs under the Agent Runtime identity described in that entry. | Google documents that the connection between Agent Runtime and Gemini Enterprise is compliant with VPC Service Controls. |
| [Self-hosted agent on Google Cloud Run or GKE](/agent-platforms/self-hosted-gcp/) | Cloud Run runs the service as a service account (the Compute Engine default service account if you do not choose one). | Cloud Run can send egress traffic to a VPC network with Direct VPC egress (recommended) or a VPC connector, giving access to resources with internal IP addresses. |

## The checklist, Google Cloud column

- [Give each agent its own role or service account, not a shared one](/checklist/own-identity-per-agent/): Create dedicated service accounts for each application, or use a per-agent agent identity on Agent Runtime.
- [Use short-lived role credentials and no long-lived access keys for the agent](/checklist/short-lived-credentials/): Use workload identity or an attached service account instead of service account keys, which Google describes as powerful credentials that can present a security risk.
- [Limit who can pass, attach or impersonate the agent's role](/checklist/restrict-who-can-attach-role/): Grant the Service Account User role only to principals that need to attach the service account to a resource.
- [Scope the role's trust to the specific agent, service account or workload](/checklist/scope-trust-to-the-agent/): In IAM policies, grant access to the principal that corresponds to one Kubernetes workload, not to the whole cluster or project.
- [Do not run the agent as a default or pre-granted account](/checklist/no-default-accounts/): Do not rely on the Compute Engine default service account, which can receive the Editor role; enforce the iam.automaticIamGrantsForDefaultServiceAccounts constraint.
- [Write the agent's permission policy from what its tools actually call](/checklist/least-privilege-policy/): Grant the agent identity only the roles its code needs; Google describes agent identity as enabling a least-privilege approach.
- [Set an organization-level ceiling the agent's role cannot exceed](/checklist/set-permission-ceiling/): Use Principal Access Boundary policies to define the resources the agent's principal may access.
- [Explicitly deny the agent IAM changes and destructive actions](/checklist/deny-iam-changes-and-destructive-actions/): Use an IAM deny policy that targets agent identities; Google's example denies all agents in an organization from creating roles and deleting buckets.
- [Compare the agent's granted permissions with what it used and remove the rest](/checklist/remove-unused-permissions/): Use IAM role recommendations to identify and remove excess permissions.
- [Grant roles at the narrowest scope that works](/checklist/narrowest-scope/): Add IAM Conditions so a role binding applies only when conditions are met.
- [Keep the encryption keys for agent data under your control and limit who can use them](/checklist/control-the-keys/): Use Cloud KMS customer-managed encryption keys (CMEK) and grant key access only to the identities that need it.
- [Block public access on storage the agent can write to](/checklist/block-public-exposure/): Enable public access prevention on buckets or through the organization policy constraint.
- [Put data stores the agent reads inside a perimeter that blocks copying data out](/checklist/data-perimeter/): Use VPC Service Controls, which Google documents as protecting against the risk of data exfiltration.
- [Limit data access with tags, attributes or conditions, not only resource lists](/checklist/condition-based-data-access/): Use IAM Conditions on role bindings.
- [Run agent compute on private networks with no direct path to the internet](/checklist/private-network-no-direct-internet/): Use a Private Service Connect interface so Agent Runtime traffic stays inside Google's network and never crosses the public internet.
- [Allow outbound traffic only to the destinations the agent needs](/checklist/allowlist-egress/): Use VPC firewall rules to allow or deny connections, including egress.
- [Reach cloud APIs and data stores through private endpoints](/checklist/private-endpoints-for-cloud-apis/): Use Private Google Access so VMs with only internal IP addresses can reach Google APIs.
- [Keep the agent's code from reading node, instance or other workloads' credentials](/checklist/credential-isolation/): Use Workload Identity Federation for GKE, which protects the metadata that metadata concealment covered.
- [Give each tool function its own least-privilege role instead of the agent's role](/checklist/tool-own-role/): Create dedicated service accounts for each application, so each tool service can have its own account.
- [Restrict which principals can invoke each tool endpoint](/checklist/restrict-tool-invokers/): Grant the Cloud Run Invoker role only to the agent's service account.
- [Cap how much the agent can run and spend](/checklist/cap-run-and-spend/): Set a maximum number of Cloud Run instances and Cloud Billing budget alerts.
- [Decide for each tool whether the action runs with the agent's authority or the signed-in user's](/checklist/decide-user-or-agent-authority/): Google describes separate user, agent and delegated identities; delegated calls are governed by both the agent's policies and the user's permissions.
- [Run agents in their own account, project or subscription](/checklist/dedicated-account-project-subscription/): Use a separate project, grouped under folders in the resource hierarchy.
- [Tag every agent resource with an owner and environment, and enforce the tags](/checklist/tag-agent-resources/): Attach tags, which are key-value pairs, to resources.
- [Test permission and policy changes in a dry run before enforcing them](/checklist/test-before-enforcing/): Use organization policies in dry-run mode to monitor how a policy would behave.
- [Remove the agent's identity and access when the agent is retired](/checklist/retire-identity-with-agent/): Use agent identity, which Google documents as tied to the lifecycle of the agent.
- [Turn on organization-wide audit logging of control-plane actions](/checklist/control-plane-audit-logs/): Rely on Admin Activity audit logs, which cannot be disabled.
- [Log reads and writes to the data the agent touches](/checklist/log-data-access/): Enable Data Access audit logs, which are disabled by default for most services.
- [Make every logged action traceable to the specific agent identity](/checklist/attribute-actions-to-the-agent/): Agent identity appears in logs across Google Cloud services, and for user-delegated flows logs show both the user and the agent.
- [Alert on denied calls and on changes to the agent's role or policies](/checklist/alert-on-denied-and-role-changes/): Create log-based alerting policies that notify you when a specific message appears in logs.

**Where Act is behind.** Act draws the boundary at the access layer (cloud IAM and network controls, and the gateways or MCP servers in front of agents); it does not inspect prompts or model outputs, which needs a different tool. Your team applies the boundaries it proposes, and its customer evidence for AI boundaries is less mature than for its core access control.

## Related pages

- [What an AI agent can access in Azure](/clouds/azure/)
- [About](/about/)
- [Editorial policy](/editorial-policy/)

## Sources

- docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/build/runtime/setup: https://docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/build/runtime/setup (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/scale/runtime/deploy-an-a: https://docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/scale/runtime/deploy-an-agent (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/scale/runtime/agent-ident: https://docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/scale/runtime/agent-identity (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/govern/identity-delegatio: https://docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/govern/identity-delegation-architecture (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/scale/runtime/private-ser: https://docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/scale/runtime/private-service-connect-interface (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/machine-learning/general/: https://docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/machine-learning/general/vpc-service-controls (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/scale/runtime/logging: https://docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/scale/runtime/logging (read 10 Nov 2026)
- docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/scale/runtime/manage-agen: https://docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/scale/runtime/manage-agent-access (read 10 Nov 2026)
- cloud.google.com/gemini/enterprise/docs/audit-logging: https://cloud.google.com/gemini/enterprise/docs/audit-logging (read 10 Nov 2026)
- cloud.google.com/gemini/enterprise/docs/register-and-manage-an-adk-agent: https://cloud.google.com/gemini/enterprise/docs/register-and-manage-an-adk-agent (read 10 Nov 2026)

Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026. Canonical: https://aiagentaccesscontrol.com/clouds/gcp/
