Agent Runtime on Google Cloud gives each agent its own identity, and you grant it the roles
Facts read 10 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.
Google documents three choices: a per-agent IAM agent identity (recommended, a principal tied to the individual agent); the Google-managed AI Platform Reasoning Engine Service Agent used by default; or a custom service account. Agent stdout and stderr go to Cloud Logging under reasoning_engine_stdout and reasoning_engine_stderr.
The full map ยท Google Cloud overview
Google documents three identity choices: a per-agent agent identity (recommended), the Google-managed Reasoning Engine Service Agent used by default, or a custom service account shared across agents. An agent identity starts with the Agent Default Access role (basic project-wide logging and model calling) and the Agent Context Editor role (its own sessions, memories and sandboxes). Google notes that some features of these roles may be in Preview.
The product was formerly Vertex AI Agent Engine, and some role names still read that way. An IAM deny policy can target all agent identities in an organization, and a Principal Access Boundary limits the resources an agent may reach. By default the agent has no access to your VPC; a Private Service Connect interface gives private egress. Logs show the agent identity, and for user-delegated flows both the user and the agent.
- Status
- Renamed. The old agent-builder/agent-engine documentation URLs redirect to the Gemini Enterprise Agent Platform docs, where the product is called Agent Runtime; some role names still read Vertex AI Agent Engine. Google labels some features Preview or Pre-GA on these pages. (source)
- The identity it runs as
- Google documents three choices: a per-agent IAM agent identity (recommended, a principal tied to the individual agent); the Google-managed AI Platform Reasoning Engine Service Agent used by default; or a custom service account. Service accounts are shared across agents you deploy. (source)
- What it gets by default
- With agent identity, an agent starts with the Agent Default Access role (basic project-wide logging and model calling) and the Agent Context Editor role (own sessions, memories and sandboxes only). With the default service agent, Google documents the Reasoning Engine Service Agent role. A custom service account likely needs Agent Platform User plus roles your code needs. Google notes that some features of these roles may be in Preview. (source)
- Tools and actions
- Agent code calls Google Cloud APIs through Application Default Credentials, which use the agent identity once IAM is configured. For external services, Google documents an auth manager that brokers 2-legged or 3-legged OAuth credentials. (source)
- The agent's permissions or the user's
- Both are documented. Google describes three identities: the user, the agent (acting on its own authority), and a delegated identity when the agent acts for a user with scoped 3-legged OAuth. Calls to Google Cloud APIs with agent identity are evaluated against the agent identity. (source)
- Network reachability
- Google documents that the agent runs in a Google-managed network without access to your VPC unless you configure a Private Service Connect interface, which gives private egress to your VPC and on-premises resources. With VPC Service Controls, a PSC interface is required for internet access, and the project must be in the perimeter before the agent is deployed or the agent keeps public internet access. (source)
- What is logged
- Agent stdout and stderr go to Cloud Logging under reasoning_engine_stdout and reasoning_engine_stderr. Google documents that agent identity shows up in logs across Google Cloud services, and for user-delegated flows logs show both the user and the agent. Cloud Logging is not supported for child resources such as Sessions and Memory Bank. (source)
Boundaries that apply
- IAM allow policies on the agent identity. The agent's access to Google Cloud resources follows the roles you grant the agent identity. (source)
- IAM deny policy. Google shows a deny policy that targets all agent identities in the organization to block actions such as deleting buckets. (source)
- Principal Access Boundary policy. Google documents a PAB policy that limits the resources an agent may access despite other permissions it might have. (source)
- Context-Aware Access (mTLS binding). By default, agent identity credentials are bound by a Google-managed Context-Aware Access policy to the trusted runtime, which Google says makes stolen credentials un-replayable. (source)
- VPC Service Controls. A service perimeter can limit data exfiltration, and the project must be in the perimeter before deploying the agent. (source)
- Organization policy for cross-project service accounts. Using a custom service account from another project requires that the iam.disableCrossProjectServiceAccountUsage organization policy is not enforced in the service account's project. (source)
Checks to run for Google Cloud
- Give each agent its own role or service account, not a shared one: Create dedicated service accounts for each application, or use a per-agent agent identity on Agent Runtime.
- Use short-lived role credentials and no long-lived access keys for the agent: Use workload identity or an attached service account instead of service account keys, which Google describes as powerful credentials that can present a security risk.
- Limit who can pass, attach or impersonate the agent's role: Grant the Service Account User role only to principals that need to attach the service account to a resource.
- Scope the role's trust to the specific agent, service account or workload: In IAM policies, grant access to the principal that corresponds to one Kubernetes workload, not to the whole cluster or project.
- Do not run the agent as a default or pre-granted account: Do not rely on the Compute Engine default service account, which can receive the Editor role; enforce the iam.automaticIamGrantsForDefaultServiceAccounts constraint.
- Write the agent's permission policy from what its tools actually call: Grant the agent identity only the roles its code needs; Google describes agent identity as enabling a least-privilege approach.
- Set an organization-level ceiling the agent's role cannot exceed: Use Principal Access Boundary policies to define the resources the agent's principal may access.
- Explicitly deny the agent IAM changes and destructive actions: Use an IAM deny policy that targets agent identities; Google's example denies all agents in an organization from creating roles and deleting buckets.
Where Act is behind
Act draws the boundary at the access layer (cloud IAM and network controls, and the gateways or MCP servers in front of agents); it does not inspect prompts or model outputs, which needs a different tool. Your team applies the boundaries it proposes, and its customer evidence for AI boundaries is less mature than for its core access control.
Related pages
Sources
- docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/build/runtime/setup, read 10 Nov 2026
- docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/scale/runtime/deploy-an-a, read 10 Nov 2026
- docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/scale/runtime/agent-ident, read 10 Nov 2026
- docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/govern/identity-delegatio, read 10 Nov 2026
- docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/scale/runtime/private-ser, read 10 Nov 2026
- docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/machine-learning/general/, read 10 Nov 2026
- docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/scale/runtime/logging, read 10 Nov 2026
- docs.cloud.google.com/gemini-enterprise-agent-platform/scale/runtime/manage-agen, read 10 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026.