Amazon Bedrock Agents Classic runs your agent as an IAM service role, and AWS has closed it to new sign-ups
Facts read 10 Nov 2026. Page reviewed 16 Nov 2026.
AWS documents that the agent runs as an IAM service role that Amazon Bedrock assumes. The documented service role policy covers invoking named foundation models, reading the OpenAPI schema objects in S3, and querying attached knowledge bases, with optional statements for guardrails, collaborators and code interpretation.
AWS documents that the agent runs as an IAM service role that Amazon Bedrock assumes. You can let Bedrock create the role automatically or supply a custom service role, and the trust policy names the bedrock.amazonaws.com service principal. The documented policy covers invoking named foundation models, reading the OpenAPI schema objects in S3 and querying attached knowledge bases. The contents of the console-created role: none found on 2026-11-10.
Tools are action groups, usually backed by a Lambda function that runs under its own execution role, so the function's role is a second thing to review. AWS says you can no longer sign up for Amazon Bedrock Agents Classic, existing users can continue, and it points to Amazon Bedrock AgentCore. Logging needs two switches: CloudTrail data events for the AgentAlias resource type, and model invocation logging, which is off by default.
- Status
- Renamed Amazon Bedrock Agents Classic. AWS documents that you can no longer sign up for it, existing users can continue, and the service is in maintenance mode. AWS points to Amazon Bedrock AgentCore for similar capabilities. (source)
- The identity it runs as
- AWS documents that the agent runs as an IAM service role that Amazon Bedrock assumes. You can let Bedrock create the role automatically or supply a custom service role. The trust policy names the bedrock.amazonaws.com service principal. (source)
- What it gets by default
- The documented service role policy covers invoking named foundation models, reading the OpenAPI schema objects in S3, and querying attached knowledge bases, with optional statements for guardrails, collaborators and code interpretation. The policy of the role the console creates automatically is not listed on that page: none found on 2026-11-10 for its exact contents. (source)
- Tools and actions
- Tools are action groups defined by an OpenAPI schema or function details, usually backed by a Lambda function. Bedrock invokes the function through a resource-based policy on the function; the function then runs under its own Lambda execution role. An action can instead return control to the calling application, which then runs the action itself. (source)
- The agent's permissions or the user's
- none found on 2026-11-10
- Network reachability
- AWS documents interface endpoints (AWS PrivateLink) for the bedrock-agent and bedrock-agent-runtime APIs, with an endpoint policy you can attach. AWS's VPC page lists model customization, batch inference and knowledge bases as the features it describes for VPC protection; egress controls for the agent's own orchestration: none found on 2026-11-10. Network egress of an action group Lambda function follows that function's own VPC settings. (source)
- What is logged
- AWS documents that InvokeAgent and InvokeInlineAgent calls are logged to CloudTrail as data events, which you must enable with advanced event selectors for the AWS::Bedrock::AgentAlias resource type. Model invocation logging is off until you turn it on. The agent's step-by-step reasoning is available through traces. (source)
Boundaries that apply
- IAM identity-based policy on the agent service role. The service role's policy is the main limit on what the agent itself can call. AWS shows statements scoped to specific model, knowledge base and prompt ARNs. (source)
- Trust policy conditions (aws:SourceAccount, aws:SourceArn). AWS recommends condition keys in the role's trust policy so only agents in your account can use the role, and says to replace the wildcard with specific agent IDs once they exist. (source)
- Resource-based policy on the action group Lambda function. The function only accepts calls from Bedrock when its resource-based policy allows the bedrock.amazonaws.com principal, which AWS scopes to the account and agent ARN. (source)
- SCPs and permissions boundaries. AWS documents SCPs and permissions boundaries as limits on IAM entities in general, so they cap the permissions of the service role and of the Lambda execution role as well. (source)
- VPC endpoint policy. An endpoint policy on the bedrock-agent-runtime interface endpoint can limit which principals and actions use that private path. (source)
Checks to run for AWS
- Give each agent its own role or service account, not a shared one: Use one Lambda execution role per function, or one EKS Pod Identity association per service account, so each agent maps to its own IAM role.
- Use short-lived role credentials and no long-lived access keys for the agent: Have the workload use temporary credentials through an IAM role rather than IAM user access keys.
- Limit who can pass, attach or impersonate the agent's role: Grant iam:PassRole only for the specific roles a principal needs to pass to a service.
- Scope the role's trust to the specific agent, service account or workload: Use trust policy conditions (for Pod Identity, session tags for service account, namespace and cluster; for services, aws:SourceArn and aws:SourceAccount).
- Do not run the agent as a default or pre-granted account: Replace the console-created default role with a role you wrote; AWS documents the Lambda console default as an execution role with minimal permissions (basic logging).
- Write the agent's permission policy from what its tools actually call: Start from the documented minimum policy and narrow it; AWS says to use broad deployment permissions only for development and testing.
- Set an organization-level ceiling the agent's role cannot exceed: Apply SCPs, which specify the maximum available permissions for IAM roles in the organization, and permissions boundaries on the agent's role.
- Explicitly deny the agent IAM changes and destructive actions: Use an SCP or permissions boundary whose maximum excludes IAM write actions and destructive calls on protected resources.
Where Act is behind
Act draws the boundary at the access layer (cloud IAM and network controls, and the gateways or MCP servers in front of agents); it does not inspect prompts or model outputs, which needs a different tool. Your team applies the boundaries it proposes, and its customer evidence for AI boundaries is less mature than for its core access control.
Related pages
- Amazon Bedrock AgentCore (Runtime, Gateway, Identity): identity, permissions and boundaries
- Agent Runtime on Gemini Enterprise Agent Platform (formerly Vertex AI Agent Engine, Agent Builder): identity, permissions and boundaries
- Gemini Enterprise (agents hosted on Agent Runtime): identity, permissions and boundaries
Sources
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/agents.html, read 10 Nov 2026
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/agents-classic-maintenance-mode.htm, read 10 Nov 2026
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/agents-permissions.html, read 10 Nov 2026
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/agents-lambda.html, read 10 Nov 2026
- docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/lambda-intro-execution-role.html, read 10 Nov 2026
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/agents-how.html, read 10 Nov 2026
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/vpc-interface-endpoints.html, read 10 Nov 2026
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/usingVPC.html, read 10 Nov 2026
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/logging-using-cloudtrail.html, read 10 Nov 2026
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/model-invocation-logging.html, read 10 Nov 2026
- docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/security-iam.html, read 10 Nov 2026
Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026.