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AI Agent Access Control

An agent has no access of its own: it runs as a role, a service account or an agent identity, and that sets its reach

An agent has no access of its own. Every call it makes is judged against the identity it runs as: an IAM role on AWS, a service account or agent identity on Google Cloud, an Entra agent identity or managed identity on Azure. This guide names that identity for each platform and what it starts with.

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The cloud judges the identity, not the agent

A cloud account does not know that a piece of code is an AI agent. It sees a call signed by a role, a service account or a service principal, and it checks that identity's permissions. So the first question in a review is which identity the agent presents, because every later answer follows from it: what the agent can read, what it can delete, what the logs say. The same agent code can run as a tightly scoped identity in one deployment and as a broad shared one in another. Nothing in the prompt or the tool list shows which. You find out by reading the platform's identity settings, and the map records the answer for each platform covered here. Read the identity first, then the permissions, then everything else.

On AWS the agent runs as an IAM role that a service assumes

For Amazon Bedrock Agents Classic, AWS documents that the agent runs as an IAM service role. You can let Bedrock create the role or supply your own, and the trust policy names the bedrock.amazonaws.com service principal. AWS also documents that you can no longer sign up for Agents Classic. On Amazon Bedrock AgentCore, Runtime needs an IAM execution role that AgentCore assumes to run the agent, and the console can create that role when the console role holds the listed IAM create permissions.

A self-hosted agent on AWS Lambda or EKS runs as whatever the compute gives it. A Lambda function runs as its execution role, and AWS documents that creating a function in the console creates a role with minimal permissions, basic logging to CloudWatch Logs. On EKS, a Pod Identity association maps a role to a service account in a namespace in a cluster, so two agents in one cluster can hold different roles. If access to the instance metadata service is not restricted, AWS documents that a pod's containers can also reach the node's IAM role.

On Google Cloud the choice is an agent identity, a service agent or a service account

Google documents three choices for an agent on Agent Runtime: a per-agent IAM agent identity, which Google recommends; the Google-managed AI Platform Reasoning Engine Service Agent, used by default; or a custom service account. Google describes agent identity as tied to the lifecycle of the agent, and service accounts as shared across the agents you deploy with them. In a review the difference is plain: with a shared account, one agent's grants are every agent's grants. Google creates and manages service agents, and they are not listed by default on the IAM page of the console.

A self-hosted agent on Cloud Run or GKE uses a service account. Cloud Run runs the service as a service account and falls back to the Compute Engine default service account if you choose none. Google documents that, depending on organization policy, that default account might automatically be granted the Editor role on the project. On GKE, Workload Identity Federation for GKE assigns a distinct IAM identity to each application in the cluster, so an agent can be named in a policy on its own.

On Azure the agent runs as an Entra agent identity or a managed identity

For Foundry Agent Service, Microsoft documents that each agent gets a Microsoft Entra agent identity, a special service principal created under an agent blueprint. Hosted agents get a dedicated identity at deploy time. A project-wide managed identity also exists, and Microsoft documents that legacy agents sharing it have no per-agent separation. Microsoft also documents that a newly created agent identity starts without resource permissions and that Foundry does not automatically assign RBAC roles to it, so its starting access is nothing until someone grants more.

A self-hosted agent on Container Apps or AKS uses a managed identity. A system-assigned identity is tied to the container app and deleted with it, while a user-assigned identity is a standalone resource. On AKS, Microsoft Entra Workload ID uses a projected Kubernetes service account token and OIDC federation to give pods an Entra identity. Microsoft notes that for some resources you must still configure role assignments for the identity, or calls to services such as Key Vault are rejected even with a valid token.

Three checks settle the identity before the permissions review

Run three checks first. Each agent should have its own identity (check). No agent should run as a default or pre-granted account (check). The identity should be removed when the agent is retired (check). The checklist records two gaps in the documentation we read: a way to tie the identity's lifetime to the agent on AWS, and a default-account warning for Azure, were both none found on 2026-11-10. Record those as open questions for the platform team, not as passes. All 30 checks are on the checklist.

Sources

  1. AWS: create a service role for Amazon Bedrock Agents, read 10 Nov 2026
  2. AWS: IAM permissions for AgentCore Runtime, read 10 Nov 2026
  3. AWS: Lambda execution role, read 10 Nov 2026
  4. Google Cloud: agent identity on Agent Runtime, read 10 Nov 2026
  5. Google Cloud: Cloud Run service identity, read 10 Nov 2026
  6. Microsoft: agent identity in Foundry Agent Service, read 10 Nov 2026

Last reviewed 16 Nov 2026.